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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 2012, pursuant to a plea agreement, Guy Kelly Dunne pled guilty to one count of
felony leaving the scene of an accident. He received a withheld judgment and was placed on
probation for five years. In 2014, after Mr. Dunne admitted to violating some of the terms and
conditions of probation, the district court reinstated him on probation for another five-year period
of time. In 2018, the State filed a motion for probation violation. Thereafter, Mr. Dunne moved
the district court to dismiss his case, asserting that he had an illegal sentence because he had been
on probation for six years-one year longer than the maximum possible sentence. The district
court denied the motion and Mr. Dunne admitted to violating one of the terms and conditions of
probation. This time the district court revoked the withheld judgment and sentenced Mr. Dunne
to three years, with one year fixed, but retained jurisdiction.
On appeal, Mr. Dunne contends that the district court erred in revoking his probation and
m denying his I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence because the maximum
probationary term had expired, yet he remained on probation. The sentence for a violation of
I.C. § 18-8007 is five years, and Mr. Dunne had already served six years on probation when his
withheld judgment and probation were revoked. Mr. Dunne contends that the district court's
determination that his probation was not extended or continued in 2014, and that the 2014
reinstatement of Mr. Dunne on probation was the equivalent of probation revocation, was error.
(R., pp.198-200.) The district court's decision circumvented the maximum probationary period
set forth in LC. §§ 19-2601 and 20-222 to keep Mr. Dunne on probation past the maximum
sentence allowed by law. The district court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Dunne's
probation based upon events that occurred after the maximum statutorily authorized period of

1

probation had ended. Where the maximum period of time Mr. Dunne could have been on
probation ran out on October 7, 2017, and his probation violation was not filed until
November 28, 2018, Mr. Dunne's case should be closed.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On January 2, 2012, Guy Dunne was involved in an automobile accident. (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), 1 p.43.) He drove away, not realizing the passenger had
sustained injuries. (PSI, p.43.) He failed the field sobriety tests and an analysis of his breath
alcohol content resulted in .191/.188. (PSI, pp.43, 67.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Dunne was charged by information with one count of
aggravated DUI and one count of felony leaving the scene of an injury accident. (R., pp.59-60.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Dunne pied guilty to an amended information charging him
with misdemeanor DUI and felony leaving the scene. (R., pp.59-60, 65-72.) In exchange, the
State agreed to recommend a sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended, and a
maximum jail sentence of 60 days with work release.

(R., p.67.) The State also agreed to

recommend that the sentence be concurrent with Mr. Dunne's federal sentence. 2 (R., p.67.)
At the sentencing hearing on June 1, 2012, the district court withheld judgment and
placed Mr. Dunne on probation for five years. (R., pp.78-85.) Mr. Dunne was to serve thirty

1

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copies of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
2
Mr. Dunne was employed as a mail carrier by the U.S. Postal Service for fourteen years. (PSI,
pp.30, 45.) In 2010, when he was
he sustained a foot injury and was
prescribed opiates for the pain. (PSI, pp.5, 44-45, 52.) His resulting addiction to painkillers
culminated in a theft of 24 postal packages containing opioid pain medications, from which
followed federal mail theft charges and Mr. Dunne's termination from his career employment.
(PSI, pp.44-45, 48, 51.) Mr. Dunne's father is a retired mail carrier, who worked in Boise for
forty- five years-longer than any other mail carrier in town. (PSI, pp.46-4 7.)
2

days in jail, with an additional thirty days of time to be served at the discretion of his probation
officer. (R., p.80.)
Two years later, on June 9, 2014, the State filed a report of probation violation.
(R., p.111.) The State claimed that Mr. Dunne violated the terms and conditions of his probation
by committing misdemeanor domestic violence.

(R., pp.108-121.)

On August 5, 2014,

Mr. Dunne admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation, and he was
subsequently screened for veteran's court and mental health court.

(R., pp.124, 130.)

An

amended motion for probation violation was filed on September 5, 2014, in which the State
alleged that Mr. Dunne committed misdemeanor domestic violence and domestic violence in the
presence of a child, and that he possessed ammunition and knives and consumed an alcoholic
beverage on August 20, 2014.

(R., pp.144-151.)

On October 8, 2014, the district court

reinstated Mr. Dunne on probation for five years, with the same terms and conditions entered by
the court in the order withholding judgment filed on June 6, 2012. (R., pp.154-158.) The district
court required additional conditions of probation including domestic violence and critical
thinking courses, substance abuse and mental health treatment, and ongoing supervision for
medication management. (R., p.155.)
Over four years later, on November 28, 2018, the State filed another motion for probation
violation. (R., pp.159-166.) The State claimed that Mr. Dunne violated the terms and conditions
of his probation by being charged with a misdemeanor DUI and possession of an open container,
and by drinking alcohol.

(R., pp.159-160.)

On January 23, 2019, Mr. Dunne admitted to

violating one of the terms and conditions of his probation. (1/23/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-23.)
Prior to disposition, on March 22, 2019, Mr. Dunne filed a motion to correct an illegal
sentence.

(R., pp.183-187.)

Mr. Dunne asserted that his sentence was illegal pursuant to
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I.C. §§ 19-2601 and 20-222(1). (R., p.184.) Mr. Dunne asserted that the maximum time he
could be placed on probation had ended over a year prior to the filing of the probation violation
allegation.

(R., p.183.)

Counsel for Mr. Dunne argued that LC. § 19-2603 dealt with the

pronouncement and execution of judgment after a probation violation and thus was not
applicable to Mr. Dunne's circumstance-where the court continued him on the withheld
judgment. (4/17/19 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-16; p.21, Ls.6-8; p.21, Ls.9-17.)
The district court denied Mr. Dunne's Rule 35(a) motion after a hearing. (R., pp.195202.) In denying the motion, the district court relied on statutory language authorizing a court to
"impose any sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction."
(R., p.199.) The district court first noted that Mr. Dunne's 2014 probation proceedings tolled the
duration of his probation for 128 days, pursuant to State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 727 (Ct. App.
2006). (R., p.196.) The district court summarized the issue before it as, "whether two years into
Mr. Dunne's five years of probation, upon the finding of a probation violation by Mr. Dunne, the
sentencing court could impose another five years of probation, or only three years." (R., p.196.)
In analyzing the propriety of Mr. Dunne's probationary term, the district court examined
three statutes, I.C. §§ 19-2601(7), 19-2603, and 20-222. (R., pp.196-200.) The district court
recognized that LC. § 19-2601(7) limited probation so that under "a conviction or plea of guilty
for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of not more than the maximum period
for which the defendant may have been imprisoned." (R., p.196.) The court also examined
I.C. § 19-2603 governing withheld judgments, which provides, in pertinent part, that when a
court determines that a defendant has violated the terms or conditions of probation it may, if
judgment has been withheld, "pronounce any judgment which it could have originally
pronounced."

(R., p.197.)

The district court referenced this language and the maximum
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sentence for a violation of LC. § 18-8007(2), the code section which Mr. Dunne had pled guilty
to violating in 2012, and concluded, "a withheld judgment with 5 years' probation is a judgment
which could have been originally pronounced.

And so it was a sentence that could be

pronounced on October 8, 2014. That is the sentence Mr. Dunne received on October 8, 2014."
(R., p.197.)
The court concluded that, although LC. § 20-222(1) limits a court's discretion in
extending probation to "the maximum period for which the defendant might have been
imprisoned," that limitation does not apply to Mr. Dunne's case because "Mr. Dunne's probation
was not extended under Section 20-222(1) but was re-instated following a finding of violation
under Section 19-2603 or Section 20-222."

(R., pp.199-200.)

After analyzing the three

subsections of LC. § 20-222, the court concluded that none of the subsections applied to
Mr. Dunne's situation, but alternatively concluded that the section providing for "revocation"
may be applicable where the Legislature may have intended "revoke" to mean to revoke and then
re-instate on new (harsher) terms (as in Mr. Dunne's situation), so that the language of§ 20-222
was not entirely surplusage. (R., pp.199-200.) The court also concluded that the language of
I.C. § 19-2603 applied to Mr. Dunne's circumstances, because the court "pronounce[d] any
judgment which it could have originally pronounced." (R., p.200.)
On May 1, 2019, the district court revoked the withheld judgment it had entered on
June 1, 2012, and sentenced Mr. Dunne to three years, with one year fixed, but retained
jurisdiction. (5/1/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-21; R., pp.204-207.)
Mr. Dunne filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction and the
district court's order denying his Rule 35(a) motion. (R., pp.208-210, 213-217.)

5

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court have jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Dunne's probation in 2019?

II.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Dunne's Motion To Correct An Illegal
Sentence?

6

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Revoke Mr. Dunne's
Probation In 2019

A.

Introduction
Mr. Dunne contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it

revoked his probation in 2019, because the violation that constituted the basis for the district
court's decision occurred after the court's jurisdiction had expired.

Mr. Dunne's probation

should have been over on October 7, 2017; the acts that constituted the sole basis for the
probation violations occurred in November of 2018. The district court's decision circumvented
the plain language of LC. §§ 19-2601 and 20-222-statutes limiting the maximum time period a
defendant may be on probation-to keep Mr. Dunne on probation past the maximum sentence
allowed by law. The district court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Dunne's probation
based upon events that occurred after the maximum statutorily authorized period of probation
had ended.

B.

Standard Of Review
While personal jurisdiction may be waived, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived

and "may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal." State v. Rogers, 140
Idaho 223, 227 (2004). "Issues about the district court's jurisdiction are issues of law, over
which [Idaho appellate courts] exercise independent review." Id.
A question of statutory interpretation is a question of law over which the Idaho Supreme
Court exercises free review. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689 (2004). Where the language of
a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate court must give effect to the statute as written,
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without engaging in statutory construction.

State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999);

State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App. 2000). "A statute is ambiguous where the

language is capable of more than one reasonable construction."

Verska v. St. Alphonsus

Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011) (quoting Porter v. Board of Trustees,
Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14 (2004)). Statutory language is not ambiguous

"merely because the parties present differing interpretations to the court." Stonebrook Const.,
LLC v. Chase Home Fin., 152 Idaho 927, 931 (2012) (quoting Payette River Property Owners
Ass 'n v. Board of County Comm 'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483

(1999)). Rather, statutory language "is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be
uncertain as to its meaning." Id.

An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable

interpretation; an alternative interpretation that is unreasonable would not make the statute
ambiguous.

Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. The language of the statute is to be given its plain,

obvious, and rational meaning.

Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659.

If the language is clear and

unambiguous, the appellate court does not need to look to legislative history or rules of statutory
interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389.
Another important rule of statutory construction is in pari materia; "Statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same subject."

Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax

Commission, 124 Idaho 1, 4 (1993) (quoting Meyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 89-90

(1932)).

Statutes which are in pari materia are to be "taken together and construed as one

system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of
statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be
consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions." Id.
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C.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Revoke Mr. Dunne's Probation In 2019
In Idaho, upon a finding of guilt, the district court may, among other things, suspend the

execution of judgment and place the defendant on probation under LC. § 19-2601(2). Another
option available to the district court is, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603(3), the court may withhold
judgment. In both situations, the defendant is placed on probation. See State v. Pedraza, 101
Idaho 440, 442 (1980).
The statute governing withheld judgment is I.C. § 19-2601(3). That statute provides, in
relevant part, that when a defendant has been convicted or has entered a plea of guilty in district
court, the court may:
Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may
place the defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems
necessary and appropriate.
LC.§ 19-2601(3).
The statutes limiting a period of probation are I.C. §§ 19-2601(7); 20-222(1). The
relevant portion ofldaho Code§ 19-2601(7) provides:
The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under . . . a
conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a
period of not more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have
been imprisoned.
Idaho Code § 19-2601(7) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 20-222(1) includes nearly identical
language limiting the probationary period:
The period of probation or suspension of sentence shall be fixed by the court and
may at any time be extended or terminated by the court. Such period with any
extension thereof shall not exceed the maximum period for which the defendant
might have been imprisoned.
I.C. § 20-222(1)(emphasis added).
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In Mr. Dunne's case, on October 8, 2014, his probation was reinstated for a period of five
years, commencing on October 8, 2014 "upon the same terms and conditions entered by this
Court in the Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation and Commitment filed on
June 6, 2012." (R., p.155.) The 2014 court added four special conditions and gave Mr. Dunne
credit for sixty-nine days served. (R., p.155.) In 2014, the district court did not sentence or
impose judgment on Mr. Dunne. (See R., pp.154-57.) Mr. Dunne was still on probation under a
withheld judgment. He remained on probation, under the withheld judgment, until 2018-a
period of six years. (R., pp.159-66.) "[U]nder a conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the
period of probation may be for a period of not more than the maximum period for which the
defendant might have been imprisoned." LC. § 19-2601(7); see also LC. § 20-222(1). The
offense of leaving the scene of an injury accident carries a maximum penalty of five years in the
state penitentiary.

LC. § 18-8007. Thus, Mr. Dunne's six-year period of probation on the

withheld judgment exceeded the maximum permitted by statute.
Both LC. §§ 19-2601 and 20-222(1) cap the probationary period at "the maximum period
for which the defendant may [might] have been imprisoned."

LC. §§ 19-2601, 20-222(1).

Mr. Dunne contends that his probationary sentence exceeded the maximum allowable by
LC.§§ 19-2601 and 20-222(1), and the district court failed to realize that the statutes were
required to be read in pari materia, instead finding none of the statutes governing the maximum
time a defendant could be placed on probation were applicable in Mr. Dunne's situation.
(R., pp.199-200.)
The applicable statutes governing the court's choices after the defendant is accused of a
probation violation are LC. §§ 20-222(2) and 19-2603. LC. § 20-222(2) provides, in pertinent
part:

10

At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may issue a
warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence
and cause the defendant to be arrested. Thereupon the court, after summary
hearing may revoke the probation and suspension of sentence and cause the
sentence imposed to be executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought
before it and may continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence
which originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.
LC. § 20-222(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the court dealing with the probation violation has
three choices: (i) to revoke the probation and have the imposed sentence executed; or (ii) to
continue or revoke probation; or (iii) to impose any sentence which originally might have been
imposed. LC.§ 20-222(2).
Idaho Code§ 19-2603 provides:
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of
probation, it may, ifjudgment has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which
it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment was originally pronounced
but suspended, revoke probation. The time such person shall have been at large
under such suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the term of his
sentence. The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of
service of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho Code, and
for any time served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or
suspended sentence.
I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added). If the court pronounces judgment, it necessarily revokes the
withheld judgment.
Where, in 2014, Mr. Dunne's probation was reinstated for a period of five years, "upon
the same terms and conditions" of the withheld judgment entered in 2012, the district court did
not sentence or impose judgment on Mr. Dunne. (See R., pp.154-57.) Mr. Dunne was still on
probation under a withheld judgment. Thus, the district court erred by finding that Mr. Dunne's
probation was not extended or continued. (R., pp.198-200.) The district court erred by finding
that Mr. Dunne's reinstatement on probation was the equivalent of revoking probation.
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(R., pp.198-200.)

The district court's holding was contrary to the plain language of the

applicable statutes, and Idaho Supreme Court precedent.
In State v. Pedraza, the Idaho Supreme Court outlined the options available to the court
once a criminal defendant is adjudged guilty of the charged crime. 101 Idaho 440, 442 (1980).
The Court examined the interplay between I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-222, explaining that I.C. § 20222:
[R]epeatedly refers to "probation or suspension of sentence" and therefore must
apply to probation which follows the suspension of execution of judgment as well
as probation following a withheld judgment. The last paragraph of that section is
the source of this controversy.
"20-222. INDETERMINED OR FIXED PERIOD OF PROBATION OR
SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE REARREST AND REVOCATION.
"At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may
issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested. Thereupon
the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation and
suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be executed, or
may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may continue or
revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which originally might
have been imposed at the time of conviction." (Emphasis added.)
We are convinced that the portion of the statute which permits a court to "impose
any sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction"
refers only to a revocation of probation following a withheld judgment, while the
portion which permits the original "sentence imposed to be executed" refers to a
revocation of probation following a suspension of the execution of judgment and
sentence. Construing this language any other way would lead to an irreconcilable
conflict between I.C. ss 19-2603 and 20-222. Such a conflict would lead to the
implicit repeal of I.C. s 19-2603, since it was enacted prior to I.C. s 20-222.

Id. 101 Idaho at 442 (1980) (internal citations omitted). 3

3

It is well-settled in Idaho that where an irreconcilable inconsistency exists between statutes in
pari materia, the latest expression of the legislature will control. Grand Canyon Dories, 124
Idaho at 5. Courts must construe statutes ''under the assumption that the [L]egislature knew of
all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed." Twin Lakes
Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 218 (2011) (quoting City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint lndep.
Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150 (1994)).
12

The district court erred in finding the language of LC. § 19-2603 providing the court may
"pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced" applied to Mr. Dunne's
case in 2014. (R., p.197.) This is because the court did not pronounce a judgment in 2014, and
LC. § 19-2603 is only applicable in circumstances where judgment is pronounced. See LC. § 192603. In Mr. Dunne's case, the 2014 order did not revoke either his probation or his withheld
judgment, thus, as the Pedraza Court explained, the language "impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction" does not apply as it "refers only to
a revocation of probation following a withheld judgment." Id.
Similarly, In Peltier v. State, Mr. Peltier sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his
original sentence had been unlawfully increased from five years to twenty years after a probation
violation. 119 Idaho 454 (1991). The Idaho Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, ultimately
reversed the summary dismissal of Mr. Peltier's petition due to lack of notice; however, the
Court analyzed Mr. Peltier's claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction over him and
concluded that language of LC. § 19-2601 allowed for the court to impose "any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction, so long as it was within the
statutory limits." Id. 119 Idaho at 460. The Court concluded that, at the original sentencing
hearing for lewd conduct, the district court told Mr. Peltier it was withholding judgment but that
it could impose up to life imprisonment ifhe violated the terms of his probation. Id. 119 Idaho at
460-61. Thereafter the district court withheld judgment and placed Mr. Peltier on probation for
five years. Id. 119 Idaho at 459. When Mr. Peltier violated his probation, the district court did
not violate Mr. Peltier's double jeopardy rights by imposing a sentence of twenty years, but
suspending the sentence for twenty years of probation. Id. 119 Idaho at 461.
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Because there was no revocation of the withheld judgment and imposition of a sentence
until after the maximum possible probationary period had already expired, the Court's holding in

Peltier does not apply here. Mr. Dunne was originally placed on probation on June 1, 2012.
(R., pp.78-79.) Although the probationary period was tolled for 128 days while Mr. Dunne's
probation violation was pending, Mr. Dunne's probation was statutorily required to have ended
in October of 2017. (R., pp.185-86.)
Further, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Dunne's
probation in 2019. See I.C. § 20-222; I.C. § 19-2601(7); see also State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673
(Ct. App. 2013) (holding district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of
maximum lawful period of probation for offense of conviction); State v. Ligon-Bruno, 152 Idaho
274 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the failure to commence revocation proceedings during the
period of probation was a jurisdictional defect); State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827 (Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that probation revocation proceedings must be initiated during the period of probation).
The district court lost jurisdiction over Mr. Dunne in October of 2017 and, therefore, it
did not have the authority to revoke his probation in 2019. This Court should remand the case
with an order that the probation violation allegation be dismissed and the case closed.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Dunne's Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence

A.

Introduction
Mr. Dunne asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion. It is clear from

the face of the record, that the order re-imposing Mr. Dunne' probationary period in 2014 is in
violation of the statute, but it was not until 2017 that the probationary period became unlawful
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from the face of the record. Mr. Dunne asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion
to correct an illegal sentence. Mr. Dunne respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order
denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence, and remand the case with orders that the
probation violation allegation be dismissed and Mr. Dunne's case be closed.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) permits a district court to correct an illegal sentence at any

time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84 (2009). "[T]he term 'illegal sentence' under I.C.R. 35
is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not
involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing." Id. at 86. Generally,
whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion is a question oflaw, over which
an appellate court exercises free review. Id. at 84.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Dunne's Motion To Correct An Illegal
Sentence
It is Mr. Dunne's contention that his probation of five years had ended prior to the filing

of the 2018 probation violation. (R., pp.183-85.) Mr. Dunne's probation had expired prior to the
filing of the current probation violation because Mr. Dunne was placed on probation on June 1,
2012, for the statutory maximum period of five years.

(R., pp.78-85.) Had there been no

probation violations filed, that period would have expired on June 1, 2017. During a period of
probation violation, the probationary period is tolled from the commencement of the violation to
the reinstatement on probation. State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 727 (Ct. App. 2006). Here, the
period from June 2, 2014 to October 8, 2014, a total of 128 days, is the relevant period of tolling.
(R., p186.)

Even if the probationary period was extended for 128 days past the original
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expiration date of June 1, 2017, the time Mr. Dunne could lawfully be on probation expired on
October 7, 2017. (R., p.186.)
In his motion, Mr. Dunne acknowledged that cases like State v. Pedraza, 101 Idaho 440
(1980), and Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 460 (1991), held that, upon a revocation of probation
following a withheld judgment a defendant may have a maximum statutory sentence imposed.
(R., p.185.) However, Mr. Dunne maintained that "[t]he loss of the withheld judgment, and the
ability to impose sentence for the maximum period is the entirety of the differences afforded the
court in the instance of probation violations on a withheld judgment." (R., p.185.)
As he asserted in his motion:
In the present case, the defendant did not have a sentence imposed. His probation
was continued and amended to a term that exceeded the statutory limit. There is
no authority for an extension of probation in this case beyond the original 5 years.

In the present case, the court continued the defendant on probation and modified a
condition of probation, i.e. the length, beyond the statutory maximum allowed.
(R., p.185) (emphasis in original.)
Mr. Dunne asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal
sentence. He asks that this Court reverse the denial of his motion and remand the case to the
district court with instructions to grant his Rule 35(a) motion, dismiss the probation violation
allegation, and close his case.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Dunne respectfully requests that this Court remand with instructions to grant his Rule
35(a) motion, dismiss the probation violation allegation, and close his case.
DATED this 22 nd day of October, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
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